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I. INTRODUCTION: THE CONCERN OVER "FLASHING"
On a humid July evening in 2009 at Newark Liberty Airport,
Sergey Aleynikov was not greeted by his wife and children, but rather
welcomed home by agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.' Sus-
pected of pilfering 32 megabytes of Goldman Sachs's roughly 1200-
megabyte computer software program capable of "ultrafast" computer-
ized securities trading, Aleynikov sat in a Newark jail awaiting a bond
hearing on his first night home from his new job at a trading firm in
Chicago.2 Aleynikov, a software developer, left Goldman Sachs after
roughly two years as a vice president, accepting a position that paid a
tripled salary (approximately $1.2 million) and a million dollar mansion,
and taking with him bits and pieces of Goldman Sachs's code, which he
allegedly transferred to a server in Germany.3
In the past several years, the computer "geek" has emerged from
the shadows of online gaming to the spotlight of Wall Street. Through
* Executive Editor, University of Miami Law Review; J.D. Candidate 2011, University of
Miami School of Law; B.S. 2007, LaSalle University. Thank you to Professor Ricardo J. Bascuas
for his guidance and to any others who were of assistance to this article.
1. Alex Barenson, Arrest Over Trading Software Illuminates Wall St. Secret, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 23, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/24/business/24trading.html?_r-2&hpw=page
wanted=all.
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the development of high-frequency algorithmic trading and its use in
flash trading, the "geek" has become the mastermind behind billions of
dollars in profits for large institutional investors.4 Until July of 2009,
such trading software and code were locked, encrypted, guarded, and
kept as Wall Street's technological secret.' Only upon the arrest of mil-
lionaire "geek" Aleynikov did the average investor become aware of the
technological innovation driving the world's largest investors, the
world's largest securities market, and consequently, the world's largest
economy.
The prosecutor for the criminal case, Assistant United States Attor-
ney Joseph Facciponti, summarized the significance of Aleynikov's
actions: "The bank itself stands to lose its entire investment in creating
this software to begin with, which is millions upon millions of dollars." 6
It is estimated that high-speed trading, such as flash trading, will provide
more than $8 billion in profits in 2009 for Wall Street investment firms.7
Given the enormous investment required for the development of the
software, codes, and systems capable of trading in milliseconds, in addi-
tion to the potential profits resulting from the millisecond trades them-
selves, the significance of high-speed trading has sparked heated debate
over its fairness and legitimacy.' Of great concern is the use of flash
trading, a form of high-speed trading available only to those investors
with the resources needed to develop the software.' As a result, on Sep-
tember 18, 2009, the Securities and Exchange Commission proposed to
eliminate the use of flash trading from the domestic securities markets.10
In its proposal, the SEC focuses on flash trading's effect on fair-
ness, competition, and efficiency within the domestic securities markets.
The SEC argues that the flashing of order information could lead to an
inherently unfair "two-tiered market in which the public does not have
access, through the consolidated quotation data streams, to information
about the best available prices" for securities that is available to flash
traders through "proprietary data feeds."' Furthermore, the SEC argues
that flash trading hinders both competition and efficiency by providing a




8. See Jenny Anderson, U.S. Proposes Ban on Flash Trading on Wall Street, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 17, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/18/business/18regulate.html; see also Liz
Moyer, Schumer Calls for Crackdown on "Flash" Trading, FORBES, July 24, 2009, http://
www.forbes.com/2009/07124/flash-trading-schumer-business-wall-street-flash.htmi.
9. Anderson, supra note 8.
10. See SEC Proposed Rule: Elimination of Flash Order Exception from Rule 602 of
Regulation NMS, Release No. 34-60684 (Sept. 18, 2009).
11. Id. at 5, 28.
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"last-mover advantage" to those using the flash trading system. 12 In
other words, flash traders can withhold displaying liquidity until after
their computer systems read the flash orders and can subsequently exe-
cute at such a rapid rate that "slower" traders' orders are moved aside
and left unexecuted.13 Lastly, the SEC claims that flash trading is "no
longer necessary or appropriate" because, "in today's highly automated
trading environment," flash trading does not provide the added effi-
ciency that it once did when computerized trading was less prevalent.14
However, the SEC's proposal to eliminate the use of flash trading is
unwarranted and an overreaction to the recent economic crisis. In fact,
the SEC lacks the statutory authority to eliminate the use of flash trad-
ing. But, even if the SEC had the authority, it should refrain from exer-
cising it given the importance of the national securities markets in
rebuilding investor confidence and restoring the economy, and consider-
ing the significant role that flash trading plays in those markets. To
assist in the understanding of the trading practice at issue, Section II of
this article outlines the basic mechanics of the flash trading process. Sec-
tion III proceeds by exposing the SEC's lack of statutory authority under
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and its subsequent amendments, to
impose a ban on flash trading. Section IV argues that even if the SEC
were to have such authority, the SEC should refrain from such action for
three reasons. First, flash trading enables broker-dealers to meet their
best execution obligation, and failure to use flash trading, if practicable
and feasible, could constitute a deceptive practice. Second, flash trading
promotes competition between markets, between individual orders, and
outside of the markets as the result of, and product of, technological
innovation. Third, flash trading creates a two-tiered market and further
fragments the markets in a manner that maintains fairness and is benefi-
cial to investors as well as the national securities markets. Finally, Sec-
tion V summarizes the arguments propounded in Sections III and IV and
concludes with a brief proposal of how the SEC could regulate flash
trading under its current authority and in a way that gives deference to
the numerous benefits of flash trading.
II. "FLASHING" ON WALL STREET: THE MECHANICS OF
FLASH TRADING
Since the 1980s, computerized trading of securities has become a
significant part of Wall Street. In fact, such trading has increased the
trading volume on the New York Stock Exchange by 164% since
12. Id. at 18.
13. Id.; see also Anderson, supra note 8.
14. Proposed Rule, supra note 10, at 18.
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2005.'1 As a consequence of the increased volume, computerized trading
shot-gunned a race among large institutional investors, particularly
investment banks, to invest substantial sums of money and resources in
the development of software, codes, and platforms that permit their com-
puterized trading systems to search for additional liquidity for large
orders and to execute trades in milliseconds.16 Due to the tremendous
speed at which such software can read orders and execute trades-typi-
cally thirty milliseconds to read an order and five to ten milliseconds to
execute a trade-several exchanges provide the option of using flash
trading."
Flash trading occurs in three steps.'" First, on arrival in the open
market at an exchange offering flash trading (but prior to being
"flashed"), an order to buy or sell will interact immediately with any
available contra-side trading interest at the exchange.19 For example, a
marketable flash order to buy can execute immediately against a dis-
played order to sell at the receiving exchange that is priced at the
national best bid and offer price.2 0 As a result, the public can still inter-
act with such orders at that exchange prior to the "flashing" of that
order. Second, if no such order exists in the open market at that
exchange, the order is then "flashed" on an electronic board, typically
for a duration of 30 to 500 milliseconds, depending on the particular
exchange. 2 ' Although the "flashed" order on the electronic board is
15. NYTimes.com, High-Frequency Algorithmic Trading, http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/
reference/timestopics/subjects/h/high-frequency-algorithmic-tradingindex.html (last visited Jan.
15, 2010).
16. Id.
17. Id.; see also Anderson, supra note 8. The exchanges that offer, or offered, flash trading
include the CBOE, CBSX, Nasdaq, BATS, the BOX of the BSE, and Direct Edge, a fully
electronic exchange. See Proposed Rule, supra note 10. Not all exchanges that provide flash
trading charge a fee. For example, Direct Edge offers a pre-routing display product to its
participants-the Enhanced Liquidity Provider program-pursuant to which marketable orders
are displayed to any of its participants who wish to receive the information in a data feed for
which there is no charge. See Letter from William O'Brien, Chief Executive Officer, Direct Edge
ECN LLC to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission, at 4 (June 3,
2009) (on file with author). Nevertheless, whether or not a fee is charged is of no consequence to
the analysis of flash trading.
18. For the purposes of this article, the explanation of the flash trading process has been
simplified to assist in the understanding of the issue addressed. However, such simplification does
not omit information of consequence to the analysis.
19. See, e.g., CBSX R. 52.6(a) (2009) (under CBSX flash order rule, the CBSX system will
automatically attempt to match market orders against orders at the best price in the CBSX book
unless filling the order would result in an execution of a trade-through of another exchange's
protected quotation); BOE R. ch. 5, § 16(b)(iii)(2) (2009) (under BOX flash order rule, if there is
a quote on BOX that is equal to the NBBO, then the order will be executed against the relevant
quote).




viewable by all those at the exchange, it is not factored into the national
consolidated quotation stream.2 2 Moreover, only those who have paid
the flash trading fee-provided the particular exchange charged a fee-
and who possess the requisite high-speed software and computer sys-
tems, have the ability to execute against such orders.2 3 Third, if these
computer systems fail to execute a trade within milliseconds, usually a
result of order quantity discrepancies, the order is routed back to the
open market in the original exchange and becomes available to the pub-
lic and even executable against the best-priced quotations on other
markets.24
In sum, flash trading provides potentially three opportunities to
execute any particular trade that is entered into the flash trading system.
Two such opportunities to execute are available to all investors in the
open market, while one of the opportunities to execute is available only
to flash traders participating in the transaction. Traders without flash
trading ability will compete to execute an order before it is flashed and
even have an opportunity to compete after the order is flashed (provided
the order is not executed within the flash system). On the other hand,
traders with flash trading ability will have the opportunity to compete
against other flash traders within the flash trading system and addition-
ally in the open market (provided the order is not executed in the flash
system). It merits noting that entering a trade into the flash system does
not guarantee the execution of that trade and a flash trader may in reality
have a better chance of executing a trade in the open market.
III. THE SEC's LACK OF AUTHORITY To BAN "FLASHING"
With the recent concern over fair investment trading practices that
was sparked by the downturn of the stock market and global economy,
the bank bailouts, and the "overlooked" Madoff Ponzi scheme, the SEC
initiated a regulatory overhaul of the securities markets. Despite its com-
mendable intentions, the SEC's action in proposing to ban the use of
flash trading is not only unnecessary, but unlawful. In fact, the SEC
lacks the statutory authority to eliminate flash trading, and if the SEC
were to proceed with such action it would exceed its statutory mandate.
Congress created the SEC for the protection of investors and the
public and for the promotion of fairness, competition, efficiency, liquid-
ity, and transparency within the nation's markets.25 Currently, the SEC
possesses rulemaking authority to promote fairness, competition, and
22. Id. at 17.
23. Id. at 5-9, 20-21.
24. Id.
25. See generally Paul G. Mahoney, The Exchange as Regulator, 83 VA. L. REv. 1453 (1997)
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efficiency; rulemaking authority to eliminate manipulative and deceptive
practices; and rulemaking authority to promote liquidity and trans-
parency through a national market system.2 6 This is neither an exhaus-
tive list of SEC rulemaking authority nor a static list. Yet, these three
mandates, appearing in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and its
respective amendments 27 are of primary concern in analyzing the propo-
sal to ban flash trading. Because the SEC cannot meet the requirements
propounded by the provisions, the federal courts, and the United States
Supreme Court, the SEC would exceed its statutory mandate if it final-
ized its proposal.
A. Rulemaking Authority To Promote Fairness, Competition,
and Efficiency
Under its rulemaking authority to promote fairness, competition,
and efficiency, the SEC lacks statutory authority to enact a ban on flash
trading. The sections of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 provid-
ing the rulemaking authority relevant to an analysis of the elimination of
flash trading are section 3(f) and section 23(a)(2). The SEC cannot pro-
vide sufficient evidence that banning flash trading will promote compe-
tition or that permitting flash trading will prevent competition as
required by section 3(f). Rather, a ban on flash trading will burden com-
petition and efficiency, requiring the SEC to refrain from taking action
under section 23(a)(2). As such, the SEC lacks authority under section
3(f) and section 23(a)(2) and would exceed its statutory mandate if it
proceeds to eliminate the use of flash trading.
Section 3(f) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides that
"[w]henever pursuant to [the Exchange Act] the Commission is engaged
in rulemaking ... the Commission shall also consider in addition to the
protection of investors, whether the action will promote efficiency, com-
petition, and capital formation." 28 In other words, section 3(f) requires
an analysis of whether the particular rule or action proposed will pro-
mote efficiency and competition. This analysis requires more than just a
conclusion that SEC action could promote competition-or even that the
existing practice could prevent competition. 29 Rather, the SEC must
(describing the various sources of SEC rulemaking authority pursuant to both the Securities Act of
1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
26. Id.; see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 78b, 78c(f), 78i, 78j, 78k-i (2006).
27. See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78mm (Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and related
amendments).
28. Id. § 78c(f) (emphasis added).
29. Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co. v. SEC, 572 F.3d 923, 935 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (finding that
the SEC's consideration of the effect of a proposed rule regulating fixed indexed annuities on
efficiency, competition, and capital formation was arbitrary and capricious because the SEC did
not disclose a reasoned basis for concluding that the proposed rule would increase competition
268 [Vol. 65:263
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consider the extent of the existing level of competition in the market-
place under the current trading practice and assess any potential increase
or decrease in competition.3 0 The SEC must also consider whether there
exist sufficient protections to enable informed investment decisions
based on suitable recommendations in order to determine whether the
action would increase efficiency." Furthermore, section 23(a)(2) pro-
vides as follows:
The Commission . . . in making rules and regulations . . . shall con-
sider among other matters the impact any such rule or regulation
would have on competition. The Commission ... shall not adopt any
such rule or regulation which would impose a burden on competition
not necessary or appropriate in furtherance of the purposes of [the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934].32
Lastly, in interpreting section 23(a)(2), the Supreme Court in Credit
Suisse Securities L.L.C. v. Billing stated that the SEC is required to take
account of competitive considerations when it creates securities-related
policy and embodies it in rules and regulations.
In sum, under this rulemaking authority and prior to initiating any
rule or regulation, the SEC must conduct its own analysis regarding the
extent of current market competition and the effect on that competition
as a result of enacting the rule or regulation-mere conclusory state-
ments of potential effects will not suffice. 34 The results of this analysis
must be specifically stated and if the results reveal that SEC action
would unnecessarily and inappropriately burden the current level of
competition in the market, the SEC must reject such action and proceed
no further.
In its proposed rule for the elimination of flash trading, the SEC
states that flash trading could destroy fair competition and efficiency if
flash trading were to expand to greater trading volume.36 Additionally,
the SEC states that banning flash orders could lead market participants
to display more of their trading interest, thus providing additional price
and it did not make any finding as to the existing level of competition in the market or efficiency
of existing state law).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 936.
32. 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a)(2) (emphasis added).
33. 551 U.S. 264 (2007) (stating that the SEC need not rely upon antitrust actions to address
anticompetitive behavior where the Exchange Act instructs the SEC to do so on its own and to
reject any rule that burdens competition).
34. See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(f); Am. Equity, 572 F.3d at 935.
35. See 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a)(2); see also Credit Suisse Sec. L.L.C., 551 U.S. at 264.
36. Proposed Rule, supra note 10, at 15-16 ("The [SEC] is concerned that the use of flash
orders by exchanges and other markets, particularly if it were to expand in trading volume, could
detract from the fairness and efficiency of the national market system.") (emphasis added).
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transparency. Such conclusory statements of the possible effects that
the elimination of flash trading could have on efficiency, competition,
and price transparency are insufficient to satisfy the requirements of sec-
tion 3(f) and section 23(a)(2). The SEC does not provide an analysis of
the extent of current competition and efficiency and the effect of an
elimination of flash trading on either competition or efficiency. Such an
analysis would reveal that flash trading promotes competition both
inside and outside the markets by adding volume and reducing transac-
tion costs." Flash trading also adds efficiency through millisecond
executions and millisecond re-routing of orders back to the open market
if unexecuted within the flash system.3 9 As a result, an absolute ban on
flash trading will ultimately burden the competition that flash trading
promotes. Therefore, the SEC lacks the statutory authority to impose a
ban on flash trading based on its rulemaking authority to promote fair-
ness, competition, and efficiency.
B. Rulemaking Authority To Deter and Eliminate Manipulative and
Deceptive Practices
The SEC also possesses rulemaking authority to deter and eliminate
manipulative and deceptive trading practices. However, such authority
does not extend to the elimination of flash trading. Section 10(b) pro-
vides the SEC with rulemaking authority with regard to manipulative
and deceptive trading practices. Section 10(b) states that it is
unlawful for any person . .. [t]o use or employ, in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security .. . any manipulative or deceptive
device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations
as the [SEC] may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors.40
The purpose of this provision is to prevent activities that create
artificial market activity and practices designed to manipulate security
37. Id. at 18 ("Particularly if flash orders were offered by all major markets for a security and
greatly expanded in trading volume, they could significantly undermine the incentives to display
limit orders and to quote competitively, and thereby detract from the efficiency of the national
market system.") (emphasis added).
38. Eliminating flash trading will not only increase transaction costs but will impose a
financial burden on the markets and organizations that have developed and used the flash trading
system. The markets and other self-regulatory organizations providing for flash trading will need
to "file proposed rule changes to remove the flash order functionality from their respective rule
books for each system." See Proposed Rule, supra note 10, at 44. Moreover, markets that use flash
trading as opposed to floor activity will have to switch their systems and trading structures
completely. Id. If one only considers the attorney's fees and programming fees required to do this,
the large costs on the markets are brought to light. Id.
39. See Section IV.B. infra, for a detailed discussion of how flash trading promotes
competition both within the markets and outside of the markets in the boarder economy.
40. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
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prices that would ultimately harm both the public interest and inves-
tors.4 1 Although manipulation can take many forms, it necessarily con-
sists of any intentional interference with supply and demand for a
security.4 2 The rulemaking authority pursuant to section 10(b) warrants
analysis because the SEC propounds that flash traders are given a "'last-
mover' advantage over displayed orders in other markets" and thus can
"wait to receive the flashed order" before "displaying their orders or
quotations in advance of incoming marketable order flow to attract an
execution."4 3 Such a process, the SEC claims, "may reduce [flash trad-
ers'] incentives to display their liquidity," ultimately deceiving traders
without access to the flash system and potentially manipulating the price
of a security.' Despite this possible effect from the use of flash trading,
section 10(b) does not provide the authority to impose a ban on flash
trading.
The Supreme Court recognized the concept of manipulation and
deception narrowly in that scienter, or "specific intent," is required to
find that an act was manipulative or deceptive." In order to prevail in a
suit charging manipulation or deception, it must be proven that the
defendant's primary intent in entering the transaction was price manipu-
lation or deception.4 6 Moreover, the Supreme Court has stated that
"[u]se of the word 'manipulative' . . . when used in connection with the
securities markets . . . connotes intentional or willful conduct designed
to deceive or defraud investors by controlling or artificially affecting the
price of securities."4 7 Thus, that the conduct in question had the effect of
artificially affecting the price of the security does not suffice for a find-
ing of manipulation or deception. In fact, "manipulation," as used in
securities regulation, does not extend to many trading practices that have
the ultimate effect of manipulating the price of security but are not so
specifically intended. However, there are many well-known prohibited
manipulative practices that are inherently dissimilar to flash trading.
41. See, e.g., SEC v. First Jersey Sec., 101 F.3d 1450, 1466 (2d Cir. 1996).
42. See In re Pagel, Inc., 48 S.E.C. 223, 226 (1985), affd, 803 F.2d 942 (5th Cir. 1986)
(stating that manipulation is the "intentional interference with the forces of supply and demand").
43. Proposed Rule, supra note 10, at 18.
44. Id.
45. See, e.g., Schreiber v. Burlington N. Inc., 472 U.S. 1 (1985); Sante Fe Indus. Inc. v.
Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
46. See SEC v. U.S. Envtl., Inc., 155 F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 1998); United States v. Minuse, 142
F.2d 388, 389 (2d Cir. 1944). However, once the manipulative intent is present, conduct that
artificially affects the price of the security is deemed manipulative. See, e.g., Markowski v. SEC,
274 F.3d 525 (D.C. Cir. 2001); GFL Advantage Fund, Ltd. v. Colkitt, 272 F.3d 189 (3d Cir.
2001); Nanopierce Tech., Inc. v. Southridge Capital Mgmt. L.L.C., 2002 WL 31819207 (S.D.N.Y.
2002); Internet Law Library v. Southridge Capital Mgmt. L.L.C., 223 F. Supp. 2d 474 (S.D.N.Y.
2002).
47. Schreiber, 472 U.S. at 6 (citing Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 199) (emphasis supplied).
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These include, but are not limited to, wash sales, fictitious trades, trad-
ing ahead of customers, high pressure sales tactics, deceptive recom-
mendations, generation of excessive commissions, unauthorized trading,
improper order executions, and misuse of customer funds or securities."
Because flash trading does not cause artificial pricing and there is
no specific intent to artificially affect the price of the security to defraud
through the use of flash trading, as required for a finding of manipula-
tion or deception, the SEC cannot regulate flash trading pursuant to sec-
tion 10(b)-not to mention section 3(f)-of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934. Without a finding of manipulation or deception, eliminating
flash trading is neither necessary nor appropriate to promote the public
interest and protect investors. Flash traders merely have the ability to
display, and potentially execute, their orders after other orders are
"flashed" to them in hope of obtaining the greatest rate of execution and
best possible price.49 This is far from manipulation and deception as
defined by the Supreme Court. Moreover, it is argued that flash trading
creates a two-tiered market where traders with flash trading capability
have an unfair advantage over the average investor and consequently the
ability to manipulate liquidity and ultimately pricing. 0 However, despite
potential abuses and disadvantages resulting from the creation of a two-
tiered market, flash trading creates such a market with many benefits,
including fulfillment of the best-execution obligation, increased compe-
tition, lower transaction costs, and increased liquidity." Most impor-
tantly, the lack of a specific intent to manipulate or deceive through the
creation of artificial prices is absent from the flash trading system, leav-
ing the SEC powerless in regard to regulating and rulemaking.
C. Rulemaking Authority To Promote Liquidity and Transparency
Enacted in 1975 and further amended and consolidated in 2005, the
SEC introduced its plan to promote liquidity and transparency in an
effort to facilitate a national market system for the trading of securities
through market regulation.5 2 Nevertheless, this does not provide the stat-
48. See THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION, 626-30 (rev. 5th ed.
2006). A wash sale is a fictitious sale where there is no change in beneficial ownership. See Ernst
& Ernst, 425 U.S. at 205 n.25; Dietrich v. Bauer, 76 F. Supp. 2d 312, 339 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). Also,
related to a fictitious trade is a fictitious order, or "spoof," that is designed to drive the quoted
price higher. Spoofing is a practice whereby someone enters an order to drive the price up and
then cancels the order before it is executed. See In re Monski, Exchange Act Release No. 7975, 74
SEC Docket 1815 (May 3, 2001).
49. See Proposed Rule, supra note 10.
50. Id. at 17.
51. See Section IV, particularly Section IV.C., infra, for a detailed discussion of the benefits
provided by the two-tiered market that flash trading creates.
52. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 78k-i (2006) (Regulation NMS).
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utory authority required to impose a ban on flash trading, and any reli-
ance on it would be unwarranted." A ban on flash trading would fail to
promote Congress's objectives in enacting section 11 A of the Securities
and Exchange Act of 1934 and hinder the current promotion of those
objectives via the use of flash trading and continued technological
advancement.
In deciding to enact section 11 A, Congress found that "[t]he linking
of all markets for qualified securities through communication and data
processing facilities will foster efficiency, enhance competition, increase
information available to brokers, dealers, and investors, facilitate the off-
setting of investors' orders, and contribute to the best execution of such
orders."54 Moreover, Congress found that "new data processing and
communications techniques create the opportunity for more efficient and
effective market operations"" and that
[i]t is in the public interest and appropriate for the protection of
investors and the maintenance of fair and orderly markets to assure-
(i) economically efficient execution of securities transactions; (ii) fair
competition . . ; (iii) availability ... of information with respect to
quotations . . .; [and] (iv) the practicability of . . . executing
orders in the best market.56
Thus, through section 1 1A, Congress indicated that enhancement of
competition is only one of the many goals that exchange regulations are
required to pursue to facilitate a national market system." Additionally,
the legislative history to the 1975 amendments to the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 makes explicit Congress's intent that competitive
impact be one factor among many to be considered in making regulatory
decisions.5 ' From these congressional findings and intentions, Congress
granted the SEC rulemaking authority to facilitate a national market sys-
tem through section 11 A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934." In
particular, the rulemaking authority of relevance here is provided for in
section 11A(a)(2) and section 1 1A(c)(1)(B) and (E).60
53. Some commentators have argued that the SEC exceeded its statutory mandate by enacting
Regulation NMS. See Dale A. Oesterle, Regulation NMS: Has the SEC Exceeded its
Congressional Mandate to Facilitate a "National Market System" in Securities Trading?, I
N.Y.U. J. L. & Bus. 613 (2005).
54. 15 U.S.C. § 78k-l(a)(1)(D).
55. Id. § 78k-l(a)(1)(B).
56. Id. § 78k-l(a)(1)(C)(i)-(iv).
57. See Gordon v. N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc., 422 U.S. 659, 689 (1975); see also Belenke v.
SEC, 606 F.2d 193, 200 (7th Cir. 1979).
58. See S. REP. No. 94-75, 13-14 (1975) (enhancement of competition should not become
"paramount to the great purposes of the Exchange Act.").
59. See 15 U.S.C. § 78k-I (2006).
60. Id. § 78k-l(a)(2), (c)(1)(B), (c)(1)(E).
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Section 11A(a)(2) directs the SEC to use its authority to "facilitate
the establishment of a national market system for securities . . . in accor-
dance with the [congressional] findings and to carry out the objectives
set forth [by Congress in section 1 1A(a)(1)]." 6 ' Therefore, under section
11A(a)(2) and in accordance with section 1 1A(a)(1), the SEC may enact
a regulation or rule if the proposed regulation either promotes or does
not burden the following: efficiency, competition, information trans-
parency, execution success rates, and the best-execution obligation.62
Only a regulation or rule meeting these requirements would "facilitate"
the creation of a national market system and fall within the bounds of
the SEC's rulemaking authority. A ban on flash trading would not only
fail to meet these objectives but hinder the attempt to meet them through
technological innovation.
In fact, flash trading promotes the requirements and objectives of
sections 11 A(a)(l)-(2) in three ways. First, flash trading promotes effi-
ciency as a result of millisecond trading capabilities and order routing
and rerouting. Second, flash trading promotes competition as a result of
technological innovation and order routing, as thoroughly discussed in
Section IV.B. Lastly, flash trading promotes execution success rates and
the best-execution obligation as a result of trading speed and added
liquidity, as thoroughly discussed in Section IV.A. infra. Although
information transparency as to liquidity for large orders is not necessa-
rily promoted through the use of flash trading, 63 flash trading is com-
pletely voluntary and available to all investors who choose to invest in
the requisite software providing flash trading capability. A decision not
to obtain the software is a voluntary decision on the part of the investor,
and thus the lack of information transparency that may result from the
use of flash trading is not an inherent result of the flash trading system
itself but rather the result of vigorous competition. Therefore, because a
ban on flash trading would fail to "facilitate" a national market system
as required by sections 11A(a)(1) and (2), the SEC lacks authority to
impose such a ban.
Moreover, the SEC would exceed its statutory mandate pursuant to
sections 11A(c)(1)(B) and (E) if it were to eliminate flash trading.
According to those sections, the SEC has authority to enact rules and
regulations
necessary or appropriate in the public interest, for the protection of
investors, or otherwise in furtherance of [Regulation NMS] to-(B)
61. Id. § 78k-l(a)(2).
62. See id. §78k-l(a)(l)-(2).
63. Information transparency regarding corporate information, i.e., mergers, acquisitions,




assure the prompt, accurate, reliable, and fair collection, processing,
distribution, and publication of information with respect to quota-
tions . .. and transactions ...
... [and] (E) assure that all exchange members, brokers, and dealers
transmit and direct orders . . . in a manner consistent with the estab-
lishment and operation of a national market system.64
A ban on flash trading would not promote the objectives of sections
1 1A(c)(1)(B) and (E), but rather hinder them. Through the flash trading
system, orders are routed first through the open market in an attempt to
execute against contra-side trading interest, then are routed to the flash
system if initially unexecuted, and are finally rerouted back to the open
market if unexecuted in the flash system-all within milliseconds."
Although the SEC does not require any specific timeframe in which
orders are to be transmitted and responded to, it does note that "failing to
respond within one second after receipt of an order would constitute a
material delay," potentially resulting in unreliable or inaccurate informa-
tion.66 Thus, the automated directing of orders providing potentially
three opportunities for execution within a 30 to 500 millisecond time
frame seems sufficiently "prompt, accurate, reliable, and fair" in regard
to the distribution of quotation and transaction information. Although
some liquidity for large orders may not be displayed as a result of the
two-tiered market that flash trading creates, such an effect may be bene-
ficial and thus of no consequence to the present analysis.6 7 Lastly, as
section 1 1A(c)(1)(E) essentially mirrors the language and authority
granted in sections 1 1A(a)(1)-(2), the analysis is the same as argued
above. Therefore, because of the speed of the flash trading system in
searching for and responding to orders to execute against, and because
of the identical analysis provided for sections 11 A(a)(1)-(2), the SEC
also lacks statutory authority to enact an absolute ban on flash trading
pursuant to sections 11 A(c)(l)(B) and (E).
IV. THE BENEFITS OF "FLASHING"
Even if statutory authority exists or is later provided by Congress, a
ban on flash trading would run contrary to the congressional intent in
establishing the SEC. In creating the SEC, Congress intended to estab-
lish an agency designed to regulate the domestic securities markets in a
fashion that would promote several values. In particular, the SEC is
64. 15 U.S.C. § 78k-1(c)(1)(B), (E) (emphasis added).
65. See Proposed Rule, supra note 10, at 5-9.
66. Securities and Exchange Commission, Regulation NMS Final Rule, Release No. 34-
51808, File No. S7-10-04 (June 29, 2005).
67. See Section IV.C. infra.
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required to regulate in a manner that will promote fairness and effi-
ciency, enhance competition, and prevent the creation of two-tiered mar-
kets and market fragmentation to the extent that they eliminate fairness
and burden efficiency and competition. 68 Moreover, the historic philoso-
phy of the SEC has been one of non-paternalism in which its role
focused on regulating the markets, not passing or exercising its own
judgment.6 9 In proposing a ban on flash trading, the SEC is preventing
the natural evolution of the securities markets through technological
innovation by passing its own judgment as to the importance and effect
of high-frequency algorithmic trading software and flash trading. More
importantly however, the SEC has failed to consider the values and
objectives that Congress intended for it to promote.
The SEC should refrain from banning flash trading for three rea-
sons. First, flash trading enables broker-dealers to meet their best execu-
tion obligation and failure to use flash trading, if practicable and feasible
under the circumstances, could constitute a deceptive practice. Second,
flash trading promotes competition between markets, between individual
orders, and outside the markets as the result of, and product of, techno-
logical innovation. Third, flash trading creates a two-tiered market and
further fragments the markets in a manner beneficial to all investors as
well as the national securities markets.
A. Promotion of Fairness and Efficiency via the
Best-Execution Obligation
Assuring fair execution of customer orders is a concern of the SEC
in regulating the operation of the securities markets. 0 As such, broker-
dealers have an obligation to ensure that customers receive a fair and
prompt execution of both market and limit orders." In an auction mar-
ket, the price is in theory set by an interaction of the buy and sell orders
68. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78b(b), 78w(a)(2), 78k-1; see also Order Execution Obligations File
No. S7-30-95, Sec. Exch. Act. No. 34-36310 (Sept. 29, 1995).
69. See MARC I. STEINBERG, SECURrIEs REGULATION 1, 15 (1986) ("It should be understood
that the securities laws were designed to facilitate informed investment analyses and prudent and
discriminating investment decisions by the investing public. It is the investor, not the
Commission, who must make the ultimate judgment . . . .").
70. See Order Execution Obligations, supra note 68.
71. See Order Approving NASD Inc.'s Limit Order Protection on Nasdaq, File No. SR-
NASD-94-62, SEC Exch. Act. No. 34-35751 (May 22, 1995). See generally Special Study: Report
Concerning Display of Customer Limit Orders, [2000 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1
86,306 (May 4, 2000) (providing an overview and discussion of the risks of limit orders,
particularly the failure to execute such order due to market prices moving away from the limit
price and the risk of priority given to other orders). Generally, an investor wanting to trade a
security has two basic choices: either submit a market order or a limit order. A market order
simply seeks the best currently available execution whereas a limit order specifies the price at
which the investor would be willing to trade. For a limit order, once there are buyers and sellers
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contemporaneously placed, provided there will be a perfect match of
supply and demand. However, depending on the volume of trading, the
time it takes to execute an order may vary, thus destroying some liquid-
ity for investors. To solve this, specialists in an auction market such as
the New York Stock Exchange, and dealers in a non-auction market
such as the Nasdaq, act as both buyer and seller by quoting the "bid-
asked" prices at which they will both buy and sell-quotes that continu-
ously fluctuate.7 2 An attempt is then made to determine the best availa-
ble quotes, also known as the "national best bid and offer price."7 3
Historically, this price was the best price possible. However, the rapid
development of computerized trading systems, such as flash trading,
reflects competitive innovation designed to facilitate the discovery of
better prices than posted quotes in the dominant markets. As a result, the
dominant markets have evolved into a somewhat hybrid model, incorpo-
rating these high-speed computer systems to seek the best possible price,
thus nearly eliminating the traditional floor-trading model." Further-
more, high-speed computer trading software sparked the creation of
other solely computerized markets where the same securities that were
once traded only in the dominant markets are now traded. Consequently,
broker-dealers are left with deciding "when" and "where" to execute
their customers' trades without violating their best-execution obligation.
Determining the "when" and "where" is rarely easy, and the line
between best execution and a violation of such is far from definite:
Unlike pornography, which while difficult to define is known when it
is seen, best execution is easily defined but is often unrecognizable.
This reflects the difficulty that the term "best execution" does not
connote a single execution attribute, such as a price, but rather
attaches to a vector of execution components. These certainly include
the trade price, but they also involve the timing of trades, the trading
mechanism used, the commission charged, and even the trading strat-
egy employed . . ..
However, the Third Circuit's en banc decision in Newton v. Merrill,
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith provides a guideline as to what may be
considered the "best" execution in light of rapidly developing technol-
willing to trade at that price, an effort is made by the broker to complete the transaction. HAZEN,
supra note 48, at 658-59.
72. HAZEN, supra note 48, at 654-56.
73. JAMES D. Cox, ROBERT W. HILLMAN & DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, SECURITIES
REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 1010 (6th ed., Aspen Publishers 2009).
74. See Jerry W. Markham & Daniel J. Harty, For Whom the Bell Tolls: The Demise of
Exchange Trading Floors and the Growth of ECN's, 33 J. CORP. L. 865 (2008).
75. Jonathan R. Macey & Maureen O'Hara, The Law and Economics of Best Execution, 6 J.
FIN. INTERMEDIATION 188 (1997).
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ogy and the creation of multiple markets.7 6 The Third Circuit considered
whether the defendant broker-dealers defrauded their customers when
they executed their orders at the readily available national best bid and
offer price rather than engaging in additional efforts, such as using the
Instinet system, to find a better price.7 The court held that in light of
new technological developments, "the broker-dealer, absent instruction
to the contrary, is expected to use reasonable efforts to maximize the
economic benefit to the client in the transaction."7 In other words, a
failure to seek out the "best reasonably available price" through alterna-
tive electronic trading systems could be considered a deceptive practice
if the use of such systems was viable under the particular facts.
Given the "best reasonably available price" standard from Newton
and various relevant considerations, i.e., price, fees, trading strategy, and
mechanism used, a ban on flash trading would in effect prevent broker-
dealers currently using flash trading from fulfilling their best-execution
obligation. Through flash trading, orders are "flashed" for less than 500
milliseconds, typically 30 milliseconds-but can be executed in as little
as 10 milliseconds and occasionally as fast as 5 milliseconds-before
being rerouted back to the open market and available to the public to
execute against best-priced quotations on other markets. 7 9 As such, exe-
cution within the flash trading system will most likely be the "best rea-
sonably available price" in that the broker-dealer would have used
reasonable efforts to seek out a superior price-be it the national best
bid and offer price or something more favorable-for his customers
through the use of the fastest available technology.
In addition to receiving the "best reasonably available price" via
execution through the flash trading system, the economic benefit to the
customer would also be maximized through the decreased transaction
costs associated with flash trading. For example, flash orders may be
executed for lower fees than those charged by other markets for acces-
sing displayed quotations-causing professional short-term traders with
large trading volume to shoulder most of the burden.so By eliminating
76. 135 F.3d 267 (3d Cir. 1998) (en banc).
77. Id. Instinet is a high-speed computerized alternative trading system that facilitates trading
outside of the stock exchanges.
78. Id. at 270. Newton also noted certain factors relevant to best execution-order size,
trading characteristics of the security, speed of execution, clearing costs, and the cost and
difficulty of executing an order in a particular market. Id. at 270 n.2 (citing Payment for Order
Flow, Exch. Act Rel. No. 33026 (Oct. 6, 1993); 58 FR 52934, 52937-38 (Oct. 13, 1993) (Proposed
Rules)).
79. Proposed Rule, supra note 10, at 5-9; see also Anderson, supra note 8.
80. Proposed Rule, supra note 10, at 41. On average, the total cost from increased fees for all
flash order users on a yearly basis in listed equities would be roughly $24,837,120 (8.8 billion
shares of total volume x 0.8% of total volume attributable to flash volume x $0.0014 estimated per
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flash trading, the SEC would prevent broker-dealers that currently have
access to flash trading from seeking the best and most prompt execution
for their customers and subsequently subject them to increased transac-
tion costs. Such regulation runs contrary to the promotion of fairness and
efficiency via the best and prompt execution obligation.
Newton also provides for a case-by-case determination regarding
the viability and practicability of requiring the use of new technological
developments."' This means that a broker-dealer without the resources
to obtain access to flash trading would not be penalized for failing to
execute a customer's order at a price that could only be obtained through
the use of the flash trading system. Consequently, it is irrelevant that the
high-frequency algorithmic trading systems required to access flash trad-
ing are unaffordable for many investors that lack the resources of the
large institutional investors that currently employ flash trading. Never-
theless, it must be noted that given Newton, it is possible that a failure to
use flash trading, if the use of flash trading is viable and practicable in
the particular situation, could constitute a deceptive practice on the part
of the broker-dealer and possibly result in either private or public suit, or
both.82
B. Promotion of Competition and Technological Innovation
Flash trading not only promotes competition but also evidences the
technological innovation resulting from such competition. By granting
regulatory power to the SEC, Congress intended that the promotion of
competition would be a-although not the-major facet of the SEC's
existence." Moreover, Congress intended for the SEC to "take advan-
share increase in access fee x 252 trading days). Id. at 42. In addition, the total cost from increased
fees for all flash order users on a yearly basis in listed options would be roughly $13,309,429
(13,898,735 total options contracts x 1.9% of total contracts attributable to flash volume x $0.20
estimated per contract increase in access fee x 252 trading days). Id. at 42-43. This is a total of
approximately $38,146,549 in increased access fees.
81. See Newton, 135 F.3d at 270-71.
82. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010) (prohibiting fraudulent or deceitful practices); 15
U.S.C. § 78u (2006) (granting the SEC broad enforcement powers to sue in federal court to enjoin
violations of its rules and seek other equitable remedies); see also Superintendent of Ins. of N.Y.
v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971) (confirming existence of an implied private l0b-5
action).
83. See 15 U.S.C. § 78b(b) (providing that when the SEC is engaged in rulemaking, it must
consider "whether the action will promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation.")
(emphasis added); id. § 78w(a)(2) (providing that the SEC "shall not adopt any such rule or
regulation which would impose a burden on competition not necessary or appropriate in
furtherance of [the Exchange Act].") (emphasis added); id. § 78k-l(a)(1)(C)(ii) ("The Congress
finds that-It is in the public interest and appropriate for the protection of investors and the
maintenance of fair and orderly markets to assure-fair competition among brokers and dealers,
among exchange markets, and between exchange markets and markets other than exchange
markets.") (emphasis added).
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tage of opportunities created by new data processing and communica-
tions technologies to preserve and strengthen the securities markets."8 4
Professor Klock also notes that:
[t]echnology related to the speed of communications, order process-
ing, clearing, record keeping, and the like is clearly evolving and so
goes the evolution of financial markets, including the rules under
which they operate. In other words, the rules themselves are endoge-
nous-or an outcome-to the process, not merely an input to it.
Competition is the tool of evolution which ensures adaptation and
cost minimization to survive.85
Given the importance of competition, the SEC's primary concern is
facilitating two distinct forms of competition that contribute to efficient
markets: competition among individual markets and competition among
individual orders. 8 6 Vigorous competition among markets lends to inno-
vative and efficient trading systems, whereas competition among orders
promotes transparency and efficient pricing of securities." These two
forms of competition bear an inverse relationship to one another. An
increase in competition among markets detracts from competition
among orders, and vice versa, leaving the SEC to strike a balance to
assure investors that they are "participants in a system which maximizes
the opportunities for the most willing seller to meet the most willing
buyer."" A ban on flash trading would disrupt this balance, remove the
84. Regulation NMS: Exch. Act Rel. No. 51808 (June 9, 2005).
85. Mark Klock, The SEC'S New Regulation ATS: Placing the Myth of Market Fragmentation
Ahead of Economic Theory and Evidence, 51 FLA. L. REV. 753, 786 (1999).
86. Regulation NMS, supra note 84.
87. Id. Domestically, competition exists both among a variety of different types of markets
and among orders within these markets. These are:
(1) traditional exchanges with active trading floors, which even now are evolving to
expand the range of choices that they offer investors for both automated and manual
trading; (2) purely electronic markets, which offer both standard limit orders and
conditional orders that are designed to facilitate complex trading strategies; (3)
market-making securities dealers, which offer both automated execution of smaller
orders and the commitment of capital to facilitate the execution of larger,
institutional orders; (4) regional exchanges, many of which have adopted automated
systems for executing smaller orders; and (5) automated matching systems that
permit investors, particularly large institutions, to seek counter-parties to their trades
anonymously and with minimal price impact.
Id.
88. H.R. REP. No. 94-123, at 50 (1975); see also Lawrence Harris, Consolidation,
Fragmentation, Segmentation, and Regulation, in GLOBAL EQurry MARKETS: TECHNOLOGICAL
COMPETITIVE AND REGULATORY CHALLENGES, 269-70 (Robert A. Schwarz ed., 1995) (stating that
"policies that would maximize the benefits from one type of competition can decrease the benefits
obtained from the other type of competition. For example, if all trades in a given security were
consolidated by regulation into the same market, it would be easy to find the best price for the
security, but it would be difficult or impossible for innovative trading systems to develop and be




incentives for technological innovation, and negligibly affect competi-
tion among individual orders outside of the flash trading system.
The development of flash trading evidences years of vigorous com-
petition among markets and provides a market for additional competi-
tion. Such competition led to technological innovation, which in turn
created the electronic-communications networks and alternative-trading
systems that have begun to dominate securities trading and permitted the
expansion of the investor-trader demographic.89 Flash trading creates a
separate market where large institutional investors, with the financial
resources to obtain the requisite software, can match buy and sell orders
within milliseconds. This separate market structure provides additional
opportunities to execute trades because if orders that originate in the
open market are not executed, they are "flashed" in the flash system and
ultimately rerouted back to the open market if the flash computer sys-
tems fail to execute the trade within the millisecond time frame. 90 As a
result, flash trading does not hinder competition among orders but rather
promotes competition by allowing up to three opportunities to execute
any given order. Traders without flash trading ability will compete to
execute an order before it is flashed and even have an opportunity to
compete after the order is flashed (provided the order is not executed
within the flash system). On the other hand, traders with flash trading
ability will have the opportunity to compete against other flash traders
within the flash trading system and additionally in the open market (pro-
vided the order is not executed in the flash system).
Furthermore, "flash orders can be viewed as a market's competitive
strategy to maximize trading volume and revenues that would be elimi-
nated by adoption of the [ban on flash trading]." 9' Of the 8.8 billion
shares constituting the daily volume in domestically listed securities,
approximately 1% to 2.8% of such volume is attributable to flash trad-
89. For example, algorithmic trading has become widely used by pension funds, mutual
funds, and other investor-driven institutional traders to divide large trades into several smaller
trades in order to manage market impact and risk. See Moving Markets Shifts in Trading Patterns
Are Making Technology Ever More Important, THE EcONOMIsT, Feb. 4, 2006, at 32, available at
2006 WLNR 1938733. In 1950, only 7.2% of total U.S. equity was held by U.S. institutions,
whereas in 2008, 57.4% of total U.S. equity was held by U.S. institutions, which rely on high-
speed computer-based trading systems to execute their trades. See Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States, Corporate Equities, Table
L. 213 (2008), reprinted in Cox, HIM.MAN & LANGEVOORT, supra note 73, at 101. Moreover,
computer-based trading systems have not only provided for the "average" trader to execute his
own trades through online services, but a continuously increasing number of households rely upon
institutional intermediaries, with the technological capability, to invest in mutual funds and the
like for their respective retirement accounts.
90. Proposed Rule, supra note 10, at 5-9.
91. Id. at 46.
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ing.92 Moreover, the SEC estimated that the total volume of flash orders
that executed within the flash system as of July 2009 was approximately
3.1% of total trading volume for listed equities and 1.9% of total trading
volume for listed options." This additional volume is further evidence
of competition among markets and the importance of continued innova-
tion. On October 22, 2009, representatives of Goldman Sachs released a
"Market Structure Overview" outlining the current state of the equity
markets with a focus on flash trading and other high-frequency trading
models.9 4 In this outline, Goldman Sachs reveals that the "market is
healthy" with "no dominance by any one player."95 In particular, "bro-
kers compete for customer order flow through innovative tools and
aggressive pricing" while the "exchanges compete for order flow by
reducing execution fees."9 6 As a result, Goldman Sachs notes, "fierce
competition has fostered innovation . . . ultimately resulting in more
powerful data, decision tools, and lower costs for the end customer."97
Elimination of flash trading would serve to burden competition among
large institutional investors currently accessing flash trading, remove the
significant volume attributable to flash trading, and effectively eliminate
the incentives of technological innovation. In turn, a lack of incentives
will discourage (1) larger investors developing even faster systems to
continuously maximize profits, promote competition, and lower the
costs of technology and (2) smaller investors from continuously increas-
ing resources through vigorous competition to maximize profits and
make such systems affordable to them as well.
Lastly, the elimination of flash trading is likely to have a broader
impact on both institutional investors employing such technology and
the national economy. First, large institutional investors initiated multi-
million dollar flash trading research and development projects for the
92. Id. at 42; see also Anderson, supra note 8.
93. Proposed Rule, supra note 10, at 15 n.41 ("The [SEC's] estimate of flash order trading
volume in July 2009 reflects discussions with the markets that offered flash orders during that
time-CBSX, Direct Edge, BATS, Nasdaq, and Nasdaq OMX BX for equity trading, and BOX,
CBOE, and ISE for options trading. These volume estimates reflect executions by market
participants in response to flashed order information.").
94. GOLDMAN SACHS, "MARKET STRUCTURE OVERVIEW," COMMENT TO PROPOSED RULE:
ELIMINATION OF FLASH ORDER EXCEFTON FROM RULE 602 OF REGULATION NMS (Oct. 22, 2009),
available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-21-09/s72109-53.pdf (In September 2009, counsel
to Commissioner Aguilar met with representatives from Goldman Sachs to discuss issues
involving high frequency trading and flash trading. The representatives provided the "Market
Structure Overview" to the SEC as a comment to the proposed rule for the elimination of flash
trading.).





use of flash trading on equity and options exchanges. 98 If flash trading is
eliminated, these institutions will not only have to pass up larger gains at
lower transaction costs for their customers, but will also have to write
off their investment in flash trading technology as a loss.99 The large
institutional investors will no longer expend the substantial resources to
develop new technology in a drive to compete for the higher profits.
Second, the technology sector at large is likely to feel the impact of
an elimination of flash trading. At a current market capitalization of
approximately $9553 billion,' the technology sector benefits from
increased competition among institutional investors striving to develop
the most efficient trading software feasible. If these institutions are no
longer permitted to compete in the flash trading arena, they lose an
incentive to continuously invest in and develop new high-frequency
algorithmic trading technology. Without such continued development
driven by competition and incentives, the technology sector will begin to
contract. Given the size and growth rate of the sector, a contraction will
ultimately negatively impact the broader national economy.
C. Creation of a Beneficial Two-Tiered Market and
Market Fragment
Concerns that flash trading will create a two-tiered market and fur-
ther fragment the equity and options markets in a manner that will
negatively impact them are significantly misplaced. The creation of a
two-tiered market and market fragmentation should be minimized and
constantly observed for the purposes of imposing further regulations to
ensure transparency, efficiency, and fair competition. Flash trading gives
investors with flash trading capabilities an advantage over investors
lacking such capabilities-that is, flash trading creates a two-tiered mar-
ket-and flash trading creates a separate market in which orders can be
executed-that is, flash trading further fragments the securities markets.
Despite this, however, flash trading ultimately fails to raise the concerns
that the SEC focuses on but rather creates a two-tiered market and fur-
ther fragments the markets in a manner that maintains fairness and is
beneficial to the markets and investors alike.'o t
98. Because of the potential for greater liquidity and larger profits, hedge funds and
investment banks offer million-dollar salaries to their software engineers. See Barenson, supra
note 1. For example, the Citadel Investment Group, a $12 billion hedge fund, had paid tens of
millions to two of its programmers and has spent millions more developing and protecting the
software. Id.
99. The Tabb Group, a financial markets research firm, estimates that high-frequency
algorithmic trading programs will make $8 billion this year for Wall Street firms. Id.
100. Technology Sector Table, Yahoo! Finance, Jan. 13, 2010, http://biz.yahoo.com/p/
8ttmd.html.
101. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 78k-1 (2006) (Regulation NMS).
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By providing an unfair advantage to particular groups of inves-
tors-as a result of greater resources, access to technology, or other-
wise-a two-tiered market is created and typically condemned because
of notions of "fairness" among investors. 0 2 Furthermore, market frag-
mentation-the creation of several markets trading the same security-
is usually considered a negative attribute of technological develop-
ment. 0 3 As a result, the SEC has attempted to consolidate the markets to
protect investors from these issues.'" However, similar to numerous
other SEC approved trading practices, flash trading provides significant
benefits by creating a two-tiered market and further fragmenting the
market and does not violate the values the SEC attempts to protect.
First, to understand how two-tiered markets and market fragmenta-
tion resulting from technological innovation can positively affect the
markets and maintain fairness among investors, one must look past the
SEC's unrealistic assumption that drives its rulemaking in this arena. In
analyzing the negative consequences of two-tiered markets and market
fragmentation and thereby promoting a consolidated market system, it
must be assumed-as the SEC assumes-that all investors and their
respective trading issues are identical."o' This is simply untrue. Not all
market participants possess the same objective function: "Markets frag-
ment because traders are not all identical and because the trading
problems they face are not all identical. The same fundamental asset
may simultaneously trade in different market structures because differ-
ent structures better serve the needs of some traders than others."10 6
102. Id. § 78k-l(a)(1)(C)(ii) ("[I]t is in the public interest and appropriate for the protection of
investors . . . to assure-fair competition . . . .") (emphasis added).
103. Id. § 78k-l(a)(1)(D) ("The linking of all markets for qualified securities through
communication and data processing facilities will foster efficiency, enhance competition, increase
the information available to brokers, dealers, and investors, facilitate the offsetting of investors'
orders, and contribute to best execution of such orders.") (emphasis added); see also Kathleen
Hagerty & Robert L. McDonald, Brokerage, Market Fragmentation, and Securities Market
Regulation, in THE INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION AND REGULATION OF THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY,
35 (Andrew W. Lo ed., 1996).
104. See 15 U.S.C. §78k-1.
105. See Harris, supra note 88, at 269-72 ("Consolidation can be best understood by
momentarily adopting a simple but highly unrealistic assumption. Assume that all traders and all
trading problems that they face are identical .... If this extreme assumption were true, all traders
would want to trade in the same market in which all other traders trade.").
106. See Macey & O'Hara, supra note 75, at 189. Moreover, "[t]he market in which all
participants trade in one place at one price is not necessarily the market preferred by all traders
and there is no compelling reason for thinking it best in any sense." Hagerty & MacDonald, supra
note 103, at 61. Furthermore, Professor Klock poses a rhetorical question that seems to further
show that the SEC's assumption is faulty and that two-tiered markets and market fragmentation
are not always the source of harm to investors: "Why should the SEC be concerned that an ATS
[such as flash trading] might have provided a price 1/16th better but been unavailable to a
customer when the SEC is not concerned that the customer might have lost more than that paying
more than the lowest available brokerage fee?" Klock, supra note 85, at 790.
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Thus, putting aside the unrealistic assumption and realizing that no sin-
gle investor or group of investors is identical, the benefits of a two-tiered
market and market fragmentation become visible. Flash trading and
numerous currently accepted trading practices evidence this.
The first of such practices is "after-hours" trading. The SEC per-
mits "after-hours" trading through the exchanges and various electronic
communications networks that have been approved as public-trading
markets.1o' The exchange "after-hours" trading has been limited to insti-
tutional investors and large block transactions.108 Currently on the New
York Stock Exchange, there are two "after-hours" sessions operated
through a screen-based execution system instead of taking place on the
floor of the exchange." The screen-based "after-hours" system is open
to all investors for forty-five minutes beginning fifteen minutes after the
close of trading.110 However, a second screen-based system is open to
large institutional traders dealing in large quantities of stocks and lasts
for one hour and fifteen minutes after the close of trading."' Professor
Hazen states that "[t]he significance of the screen-based system is that it
bypasses the specialist system that has been the core of the exchange
mechanism for many years."' 12 Essentially, "after-hours" trading creates
a two-tiered market-precisely what the SEC plans to avoid with ban-
ning flash trading-that is permitted to operate.
Similar to flash trading, "after-hours" trading provides added
liquidity for large orders that may take a relatively long time to execute
in the open market as the particular quantities may not be available at
the desired price. Moreover, in "after-hours" trading and flash trading
alike, large institutional investors with access to such trading can exe-
cute their large orders without significantly impacting the price of the
stock for the average investor and allowing for such an investor to still
obtain the "best available price." As a result, both large institutional
investors and smaller investors obtain advantages. This maintains fair-
ness among investors as well as provides a significant benefit to the
entire market.
107. HAZEN, supra note 48, at 618.
108. Id. Similar to the practice of "after-hours" trading is the Commodity Futures
Modernization Act of 2000, which formally recognized the over-the-counter commodities
markets. See Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763
(Dec. 21, 2000). These markets are virtually unregulated except for antifraud proscriptions and are
open only to the largest institutional investors dealing in certain forms of swap trades and other
hybrid contracts. HAZEN, supra note 48, at 618. Such appears to create a permissible two-tiered
market system.
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The SEC also permits a practice known as "payment for order
flow." Market makers can enter into arrangements where brokers agree
to send all orders to a particular market maker in return for some sort of
consideration, usually cash."' In other words, payment for order flow
occurs when a broker charges another broker a fee for directing orders to
him or her." 4 These payments are permissible so long as the payor and
payee meet certain disclosure requirements." Alternative trading sys-
tems and other investors can voluntarily enter into private agreements in
their "own" market, thereby further fragmenting the markets, in antici-
pation of increased liquidity and likelihood of execution." 6 This is simi-
lar to flash trading in that investors voluntarily enter their orders into the
flash system in hope of gaining additional liquidity for their orders."'
Voluntariness is an important consideration in that employing payment
for order flow or flash orders does not guarantee execution of any partic-
ular order and as such; orders could go unexecuted where they may have
had a better chance at execution in the open market." 8 Because such
practices are fully voluntary, the investor is well aware that he may be
taking a greater risk than if he merely entered his order in the open
market. In fact, investors without access to flash trading may be better
off than the investor who voluntarily took the chance of entering his
order in the flash system. Moreover, by permitting a two-tiered market
through flash trading, large institutional investors-who hold approxi-
mately 57.4% of U.S. equity"'-are able to lower their transaction costs
and pass the benefits on to their customers in the form of decreased
commissions.12 0 As a result, competition increases between markets and
113. See Robert H. Battalio, Third Market Broker-Dealers: Cost Competitors or Cream
Skimmers?, 52 J. FIN. 341, 343 (1997); see also Securities and Exchange Commission website,
Payment for Order Flow, http://www.sec.gov/answers/payordf.htm (last visited Dec. 31, 2009).
114. HAZEN, supra note 48, at 663.
115. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.10b-10(a)(2)(i)(c), 240.1 1A(c)(1)-(3) (2010). For example, rule
lOb-10 requires disclosure of payment for order flow in transactions where the broker is acting as
the customer's agent, while rule 1 lAcl-3 requires that broker-dealers, when opening a new
account, make written disclosures of their policies regarding payment for order flow. Id.
116. See Klock, supra note 85, at 764 ("If an [alternative trading system] pays brokers for
orders which would have otherwise been sent to the floor of the NYSE, the result is clearly more
fragmentation of order flow.").
117. Proposed Rule, supra note 10, at 37-40.
118. Id. at 25.
119. Flow of Funds Accounts Table, supra note 89.
120. Proposed Rule, supra note 10, at 24. This is unlike payment for order flow where the
broker keeps the payment, albeit pennies per share, for himself or herself. See Payment for Order
Flow, supra note 113. It should also be noted that even though directing orders pursuant to a
payment for order flow can be viewed as contrary to the broker's best execution obligation, the
practice is still permitted. See NASD Notice 01-22, 2001 WL 278615 (Mar. 16, 2001) ("[B]roker-
dealers must not allow an order routing inducement, such as payment for order flow opportunity
to trade with that order as principal, to interfere with its duty of best execution.").
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fairness is maintained as investors search for the greatest returns in a
completely voluntary system.
Another permissible trading practice that creates a two-tiered mar-
ket and further fragments the markets is the trading of "house stocks."
Stocks that are traded solely among the customers of a particular broker-
age house are known as "house stocks."l 2 1 When brokerage firms trade
"house stocks" among their customers there is no independent market to
assess the legitimacy of their market-making activities.12 2 Trading in
"house stocks" effectively eliminates an outside market, thereby creating
a separate market, and takes away competition. Therefore, customers of
the brokerage house have an advantage over the rest of the market for
the particular "house stocks." This potentially allows for lower transac-
tion costs-most likely through reduced commissions charged to cus-
tomers. Although trading in "house stocks" virtually eliminates outside
market and order competition for such stocks, trading-including solely
trading-in "house stocks" is neither regulated nor per se illegal. 1 23
On the other hand, flash trading, through its creation of a two-tiered
market and a separate market fragment, promotes competition,12 4 and
provides for the same benefits as trading in "house stocks," that is, low-
ered transaction costs. As such, flash trading positively affects the over-
all market and maintains fairness among investors through lowered
transaction costs. Moreover, trading in "house stocks" can lend to mar-
ket manipulation and various deceptive practices because the broker-
dealer acts as the sole active market maker for such stocks.125 Such mar-
ket manipulation cannot exist through flash trading, which is controlled
by numerous investors who take a chance at execution through a tradi-
tional buy-sell transaction within the flash system.
Lastly, a comparison between flash trading and historical floor
practices merits brief discussion.
Historically, exchange members located on trading floors have con-
ducted on the spot discussions of price which could not practically be
reflected in the published quotation . . . . If it were necessary to make
such terms public, it would interfere with, and might make impossi-
ble, the effective representation of . . . large orders on a trading floor.
Similarly, floor brokers can "request a market" in a security either
hypothetically (or conditionally) or with a view to executing a partic-
ular order in hand. In either case, the response of the "trading crowd"
can be different than the published quotation. It may be impracticable
121. See United States v. DiStefano, 129 F. Supp. 2d 342 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
122. HAZEN, supra note 48, at 651.
123. See, e.g., SEC v. Graystone Nash, Inc., 53 S.E.C. 2721 (D.N.J. 1993).
124. Promotion of competition is thoroughly discussed in Section IV.B. supra.
125. See, e.g., SEC v. Hasho, 784 F. Supp. 1059 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
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to require such responses to be published . . . [and] could signifi-
cantly impair floor brokers' ability to represent large orders
effectively.126
Although such "private auction" environments have been cur-
tailed,127 they still exist, and the market makers and floor specialists
continue to operate as forms of permissible monopolies that greatly ben-
efit institutional investors with large orders. In light of the SEC's
attempts to adapt the auctions system applicable to securities exchanges
to an entirely electronic environment, as evidenced by the approval of
the International Securities Exchange registration as a national securities
exchange in 2000,128 it seems necessary to permit flash trading. Flash
trading electronically provides for the "private auction" of large orders
that the SEC has considered indispensable despite that the prices
flashed-similar to the prices discussed on the floor among floor spe-
cialists and market makers in floor trading-are not published in the
consolidated quotation data for the public to view. Although flash trad-
ing creates a two-tiered market and further fragments the markets, the
SEC itself noted the importance and necessity of a two-tiered market
and market fragmentation when it involves large institutional orders, as
stated above. 129 Without such, large orders would not be represented
effectively, and as a result liquidity would diminish and the orders
would fail to execute. Given the recent move to establish fully electronic
markets, flash trading appears essential to serve the same or a similar
function as the "private auctions" of the traders on the floors of the
exchanges.
V. CONCLUSION: "FLASHING" FOR AMERICAN CAPITALISM
With the advent of high-speed computerized trading, the structure,
function, and profitability of securities trading has compounded expo-
nentially. However, along with the benefits of technological innovation
in the securities markets has come turbulence and consequently, growing
concern over increased regulation. In 2009 alone, the SEC proposed new
rules for credit-ratings agencies, executive compensation, and flash trad-
ing.130 The recent drastic decline in the national and global securities
126. Proposed Rule, supra note 10, at 27.
127. See generally 17 C.F.R. § 240.11a-1 (2010) (prohibiting all floor trading by members,
unless conducted in accordance with a plan adopted by an exchange and approved by the SEC).
For example, a floor trader is prohibited from trading for a customer's account over which the
trader exercises discretion. Id.
128. See Approval of Application for Exchange Registration International Securities Exchange
L.L.C., SEC News Digest 2000-36, 2000 WL 218366 (Feb. 25, 2000).
129. Proposed Rule, supra note 10, at 27.
130. See generally Securities and Exchange Commission website, Securities and Exchange
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markets and economies alerts that some consideration must be given to
the various missteps and failures culminating in such decline and that
some additional regulation may be warranted. Nevertheless, a ban on
the use of flash trading is unnecessary, inappropriate, and merely an
overreaching SEC action in the "heat of passion."
If the SEC finalizes its proposal of eliminating the use of flash trad-
ing, it will exceed its statutory mandate. Currently, the SEC possesses
rulemaking authority to promote fairness, competition, and efficiency;
rulemaking authority to eliminate manipulative and deceptive practices;
and rulemaking authority to promote liquidity and transparency through
a national market system.m' These grants of authority are provided for
through the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and its respective amend-
ments. However, none of them permit the SEC to impose a ban on the
use of flash trading.
The SEC's rulemaking authority to promote fairness, competition,
and efficiency does not provide the authority because of the SEC's fail-
ure to offer more than mere conclusory statements regarding the
probability of the potentially negative effects of flash trading. The SEC
fails to provide an analysis of the extent of current competition and effi-
ciency and the effects of flash trading on that competition and effi-
ciency, but rather it inadvertently makes evident the burden on
competition that would result from the elimination of flash trading. Fur-
ther, the SEC lacks the statutory authority under its rulemaking authority
to deter and eliminate manipulative and deceptive trading practices
because the SEC fails to establish that flash trading is deceptive or
manipulative, as defined by the Supreme Court-that is, flash trading is
neither specifically intended to nor does it artificially control prices of
securities and thereby manipulate the security's price and the market at
large. Moreover, flash trading is neither intended nor "designed to
deceive or defraud."l 32
Lastly, the SEC's rulemaking authority to promote liquidity and
efficiency through a national market system does not provide sufficient
authority to ban flash trading because the use of flash trading promotes
the objectives that Congress intended for the SEC to promote through its
regulations and rulemaking. First, flash trading promotes efficiency as a
result of millisecond trading capabilities and order routing and rerouting.
Second, flash trading promotes competition as a result of technological
Commission Proposed Rules 2009, http://www.sec.gov/ruies/proposed.shtml (last visited Dec. 31,
2009) (providing access to all SEC proposed and final rules of 2009).
131. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78b, 78c(f), 78i, 78j, 78k-I (2006).
132. Schreiber v. Burlington N. Inc., 472 U.S. 1, 6 (1985) (citing Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,
425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976)).
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innovation and order routing. Third, flash trading promotes execution
success rates and the best-execution obligation as a result of trading
speed and added liquidity. Finally, flash trading promotes "prompt,
accurate, reliable, and fair" 3 dissemination of information and execu-
tion pursuant to that information. In sum, flash trading meets and
exceeds Congress's objectives in enacting the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 and its respective amendments. If the SEC imposes a ban on
flash trading, it will hinder the objectives that it was created to promote.
Even if the SEC possesses the statutory authority to eliminate flash
trading, or even if such authority is subsequently provided, the SEC
should refrain from eliminating flash trading. The SEC should refrain
from eliminating flash trading for the following three reasons. First,
flash trading enables brokers-dealers to meet their best execution obliga-
tion and failure to use flash trading, if practicable and feasible under the
facts, could constitute a deceptive practice subject to liability. Second,
flash trading promotes competition between markets, between individual
orders, and outside of the markets as the result of, and as the product of,
technological innovation. Third, flash trading creates a two-tiered mar-
ket and further fragments the markets in a manner that maintains fair-
ness and is beneficial to both investors as well as the national securities
markets.
If the SEC is to proceed, it is recommended that it consider pursu-
ing two avenues of regulatory action before it decides to impose a ban
on flash trading. First, the SEC should impose an "emergency ban" on
flash trading among the exchanges and self-regulatory organizations that
currently provide for the use of flash trading. Pursuant to the Market
Reform Act of 1990, the SEC possesses emergency power to suspend,
alter, or impose rules for a maximum of ten business days.'34 During this
"emergency ban" the SEC could conduct a thorough analysis of the
extent of current market competition and assess the specific impact flash
trading has on the markets in an effort to determine whether an absolute
ban on flash trading is either necessary or appropriate. After this analy-
sis, the SEC should consider subjecting flash trading to similar disclo-
sure requirements as currently required for payment for order flow.13 5 A
policy of disclosure would provide for significant regulatory oversight
without adversely impacting the tremendous benefits that flash trading
provides for the liquidity, efficiency, competition, technological innova-
tion, and profitability of the national securities markets.
133. 15 U.S.C. § 78k-l(c)(1)(B) (2006).
134. Id. § 781(k)(2) (2006).
135. See generally 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.10b-10(a)(2)(i)(c), 240.11A(c)(l)-(3) (2010) (providing
for written disclosures to clients if brokers-dealers employ payment for order flow).
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Nevertheless, the SEC should reconsider its proposal to eliminate
flash trading for the sake of technology, the national securities markets,
and the American capitalist economy. Although the current economic
downturn and investment-related scandals warrant attention and poten-
tial regulatory action, the SEC should exercise a degree of restraint in
regard to flash trading. In proposing a ban on flash trading, the SEC is
preventing the natural evolution of the securities markets through tech-
nological innovation-thereby removing incentives of such innova-
tion-by passing its own judgment as to the importance and effect of
flash trading. The SEC has failed to consider the values and objectives
that Congress intended for it to promote. Most importantly, however, in
addition to considering the state of the economy and Congress's intent,
the SEC must always keep in mind that:
[e]very individual ... neither intends to promote the public interest,
nor knows how much he is promoting it . .. he intends only his own
security; and by directing that industry in such a manner as its pro-
duce may be of the greatest value, he intends only his own gain, and
he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to pro-
mote an end which was no part of his intention. 136
136. ADAM SMrrH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, BOOK IV, CHAVTER II, 658-65 (Bantam
Classics 2003) (1776).
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